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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1996, Congress passed the first substantial rework of the
Communications Act of 1934.1 This Act was intended to benefit consumers
by encouraging competition and establishing a series of explicit
mechanisms for assuring universal service. As with any complex
legislation-particularly a federal body of legislation that took five years to
pass-there have been unforeseeable and unintended consequences.
Accelerating technological changes have also added unexpected outcomes.
One of these outcomes is the creation of significant controversy over the
federal, and in some cases, state universal service subsidy for the class of
telecommunications providers typically known as wireless or cellular and
defined by federal statute as "commercial mobile radio service"
("CMRS ).2 Incumbent local exchange carriers ("ILECs")-traditional
local telephone companies using much more costly landline telephone
systems-characterize these subsidies as a windfall and as unnecessary to
provide wireless phone service. They argue that federal and state universal
service funding is intended to subsidize high-cost local telephone service-
not wireless service-which is substandard compared to landline service.
CMRS providers assert that the federal Act was designed to create
competition and that their services provide consumers alternatives, create
competition, and provide a quality and convenient service with mobile
advantages not offered by landlines.
This Article will examine two recent Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") decisions and a Federal-State Joint Board on
Universal Service Recommended Decision3 that are impacting this
regulatory landscape. These decisions will affect the manner in which the
FCC and state public utility commissioners deal with the eligible
telecommunications carrier designation affecting the viability of
companies, the scope of services to consumers, and the allocation of
hundreds of millions of universal service dollars annually.
1. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
2. 47 CFR § 20.3 (2005) (providing a definition of CMRS). See also Federal-State
Joint Board on Universal Service, Western Wireless Corp., Memorandum Opinion And
Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 48, para. 11 (2000), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/
attachmatch/DA-00-2896Al.pdf [hereinafter Western Wireless Order].
3. Western Wireless Order, supra note 2.
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II. BACKGROUND
Universal service, assuring affordable residential access for all
Americans, is a long-standing goal of federal policymakers. 4 Beginning
with the Communications Act of 1934, Congress established a policy of
making telecommunications available "so far as possible, to all the people
oI" the United States."5 In the 1950s, universal service efforts by the FCC,
state regulators, and industry began to promote access through a series of
cross-subsidies. 6 "Because American Telephone and Telegraph Company
(AT&T) provided both nationwide long distance service and local
telephone service to approximately 80 percent of the nation's telephone
subscribers, universal service was largely promoted by shifting costs
between different customers and services." The most politically appealing
cross-subsidies were long distance revenues subsidizing local telephone
service, business service subsidizing residential service, and urban service
subsidizing rural service.8 This scheme of implicit subsidy was complex
and largely ordered upon AT&T's monopoly structure.
The universal service landscape began to change following the
intricate 1982 settlement between the United States Department of Justice
and AT&T in the government's antitrust case against the
telecommunications giant. The FCC addressed the concern for potential
excessive rate hikes by implementing a two-pronged approach to universal
service subsidization. First, the FCC mandated that long-distance
companies pay access charges to local phone companies as a means to pay
for the origination and termination of long-distance phone calls. 10 Second,
local phone service customers were charged a "subscriber line charge" to
help offset local phone companies costs. Subsequent complaints by long-
distance companies arguing that access charges raised consumer long-
distance rates and unnecessarily inflated local companies' profits were
among issues under discussion as Congress began debating the Federal
4. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TELECOMMUNICATIONS:
FEDERAL AND STATE UNIVERSAL SERVICE PROGRAMS AND CHALLENGES TO FUNDING (Feb.
2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02187.pdf [hereinafter GAO
CHALLENGES TO FUNDING].
5. Id. at 2 (quoting Title 1 of the Communications Act of 1934).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. STUART MINOR BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 618-19
(2001).
9. See United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd, 460 U.S.
1001 (1983).
10. BENjAmiN, supra note 8, at 713.
11. Id.
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Telecommunications Act that would be passed in 1996.12
The 1996 Federal Telecommunications Act moved from a system of
implicit subsidy to statutory support for explicit universal service
13funding. While this Article will focus on the application of universal
service mechanisms used to support provision of services to rural and high-
cost areas, the Act broadened the scope of universal service to support
eligible schools, libraries, and rural health providers and continued support
of access for low-income consumers. 14 The Act changed the mechanism for
universal service funding. "Every telecommunications carrier that provides
interstate telecommunications services [is now required to contribute] on an
equitable and nondiscriminatory basis."' 15 Contributions are deposited into
the federal Universal Service Fund ("USF") and are administered and
distributed by the Universal Service Administrative Company ("USAC") in
accord with regulations promulgated by the FCC. 16
While the FCC is the agency charged with promulgating regulations
and in acting as a quasi-judicial body in accordance with the 1996
Telecommunications Act, telecommunications regulation has a history of
joint federal and state regulation. Congress recognized this shared role
when it mandated that the FCC create a Federal-State Joint Board on
Universal Service ("Joint Board") 17 as a mechanism for communication
and coordination between the FCC and state commissions in developing
and implementing a federal program of universal service. This board
develops reports and recommendations which the FCC and state
commissions have relied upon during the evolution of federal universal
service support.18
II1. CONTROVERSY AND SIGNIFICANCE
Only eligible telecommunications carriers ("ETCs") are able to draw
funds from the federal USF. 19 Some states have created their own universal
service funds and have tied state eligibility requirements to those of the
federal Act. The 1996 Telecommunications Act created the opportunity
12. Id. at 714.
13. GAO CHALLENGES TO FUNDING, supra note 4, at 3.
14. Id.
15. 47 U.S.C. § 254(d) (2002).
16. GAO CHALLENGES TO FUNDING, supra note 4, at 4.
17. 47 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1) (2000).
18. See Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Virginia Cellular, LLC,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 1563, para. 19. [hereinafter Virginia
Cellular Order].
19. 47 U.S.C. § 254(e) (2002).
20. Kansas is such a state. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 66-2008(c) (2003).
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for companies other than ILECs to become ETCs and to be subsidized for
serving rural areas.2 1 This new class of ETCs, sometimes known as
Competitive Eligible Telecommunications Carriers ("CETCs"), has
exploded in number. The growth in the number of ETCs has been
geometric as providers have sought the economic benefit of the universal
service subsidy. The Joint Board noted this growth in its 2004
recommended decision.
Based on USAC data, 2 competitive ETCs received just over $500,000
in high-cost support in 1999, 4 competitive ETCs received $1.5 million
in 2000, 25 competitive ETCs received $17 million in 2001, and 64
competitive ETCs received $47 million in 2002. In 2003, 109
competitive ETCs received approximately $131.5 million in high-cost
support. Based on USAC quarterly projections, support for competitive
ETCs will increase from $62.9 million in the fourth quarter of 2023, to
$111.5 million in the second quarter of 2004, an increase of 77%.
This rise in expenditures is contrary to congressional expectations.
Congress believed that competition and new technologies would reduce
dependence upon universal service support by lowering costs.
23
According to the Organization for the Promotion and Advancement of
Small Telecommunications Companies ("OPASTCO"), whose members
are rural independent telephone companies serving high-cost areas, the vast
majority of the growth in ETCs has resulted from wireless companies
successfully seeking and receiving certification as CETCs. 24 The Joint
Board has noted that, "[t]he vast majority of multiple connections provided
today-the overwhelming bulk of the 148 million CMRS handsets-are
not subsidized.... Moreover, studies have shown little if any difference in
pricing between rural and urban markets. ' 25 Such data would suggest that a
universal service subsidy is not required to assure wireless services in rural
areas. In contrast, wireless providers argue that to completely provide high-
quality wireless coverage to service areas with remote regions and sparse
21. See 47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(2) (2002).
22. Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Recommended Decision, 19 F.C.C.R.
10,812, para. 67 n. 183 (2004) (citation omitted) [hereinafter Joint Board Decision].
23. Id. para. 65 n.180 (citing S. REP. No. 104-23, at 26 ("The Committee expects that
competition and new technologies will greatly reduce the actual cost of providing universal
service over time, thus reducing or eliminating the need for universal service support
mechanisms as actual costs drop to a level that is at or below the affordable rate for such
service in an area...") (citation omitted)).
24. Stuart Polikoff, USF = Keeping Rural America Connected, Presentation Before
NARUC Staff Subcommittee on Accounting and Finance 6 (Sept. 16, 2003), available at
http://www.puc.state.id.us/RELATEDSITES/ACCT/polikoff.ppt [hereinafter USF
PowerPoint].
25. Joint Board Decision, supra note 22, para. 62 n.167.
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populations, a subsidy is necessary.26
Based upon existing federal rules, when a wireless provider is
recognized as a CETC in a high-cost study area, it may seek universal
service support for all of its wireless "lines" or subscriptions in that area.
27
This may mean that without any visible change in the type of service
provided to local customers, even if the wireless services were initially
deployed without any expectation of federal subsidy, the newly designated
CETC is able to draw universal service funding for those services.
28
Therefore, it is clear that as a CETC enters and adds lines, the demand for
required universal service support increases. This is also the case if a CETC
takes lines from an ILEC. ILEC support does not fall to offset the CETC
support. The amount of support increases to even higher levels because
there is a subsequent up-tick in support based on the rural ILEC's now-
increased effective per-line costs.
29
OPASTCO and similar ILEC advocates, argue that the skyrocketing
growth of CETC study areas and support threatens the sustainability of
universal service funding for rural and high-cost areas. Growth of
distributions and requisite demands for contributions are likely to face
political resistance. Cuts in distributions to rural ILECs threaten the
viability of these companies which often carry substantial embedded costs
inherent in building and upgrading landline networks in sparsely populated
areas. OPASTCO points to the contribution factor applied to interstate
telecommunications services for universal service rising from 5.7 percent
in the fourth quarter of 2000 to 9.2 percent in the fourth quarter of 2004 as
evidence of the impact of growing expenditures from the fund. OPASTCO
expresses concerns that increases of this magnitude cannot be sustained and
that if the number of carriers receiving support continues to grow "then no
carrier will have the funding necessary to provide affordable, high-quality
26. Petition of RCC Minnesota, Inc. for Designation as an Eligible Telecomm. Carrier
Under 47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(2), Verified Petition, Dkt. No. 04-RCCT-338-ETC, para. 33
(2003) (appearing before the State Corporation Commission of the state of Kansas).
27. Joint Board Decision, supra note 22, para. 67.
28. Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Highland Cellular, Inc., Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 6422, paras. 17-18 (2004) [hereinafter Highland Cellular
Order]. The actual probability of a wireless company successfully receiving approval of its
status quo infrastructure may be rare in the future. The Highland Cellular ETC designation
is a representation of other recent FCC designations. In Highland Cellular, the FCC required
a commitment to infrastructure upgrades and reporting. However, the FCC clearly
acknowledged in its decision that Highland Cellular was seeking to provide services largely
using existing infrastructure. See id.
29. Joint Board Decision, supra note 22, para. 70. See also Virginia Cellular Order,
supra note 18, para. 43.
30. USF PowerPoint, supra note 24, at 7.
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telecommunications services and rural consumers will be denied the
benefits promised by the Act."
' 31
OPASTCO argues that "[riural ILECs are the only providers of
ubiquitous, high-quality, facilities-based telecommunications service
throughout their respective areas. For rural ILECs, high-cost support is a
critical means of genuine cost recovery."
' 32
This series of arguments would conclhde that reduction in universal
service support for rural ILECs will negatively impact rural consumers. In
contrast, advocates for wireless companies can successfully document
public advantages to CETC designation for wireless providers. When the
FCC recently approved a wireless CETC in Virginia, it recognized that the
wireless company would be serving residences "that ... do not have access
to the public switched network through the incumbent telephone
"33
company. The FCC recognized the mobility advantage that wireless
service offers rural consumers, who "must drive significant distances to
places of employment, stores, schools, and other critical community
locations." 34 Additionally, the FCC pointed to the benefit of access to
emergency services "that can mitigate the unique risks of geographic
isolation associated with living in rural communities."35 These benefits are
tangible and accrue to the persons intended to benefit from universal
service.
IV. ELIGIBLE TELECOMMUNICATIONS DESIGNATION
FRAMEWORK
A. 1996 Telecommunications Act
Section 214(e)(2) of the federal Act delegates to state public utility
commissions the primary responsibility for designating ETCs. However, by
state law some state public utility commissions do not have jurisdiction toS 36
make this decision or to otherwise regulate CRMS providers. Section
214(e)(6) 37 directs the FCC to designate eligible carriers when those
carriers are not subject to the jurisdiction of the state commission. 38 This
31. Stuart Polikoff, OPASTCO, Universal Service in Rural America: A Congressional
Mandate At Risk 8 (2003), available at http://www.opastco.org/docs/USFWhitePaper.pdf.
32. USF PowerPoint, supra note 24, at 7.
33. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18, para. 29 (citation omitted).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Western Wireless Order, supra note 2.
37. 47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(6) (2000).
38. Id.
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has created a legal anomaly as state commissions are called to interpret and
apply federal statutes and FCC regulations in designating most ETCs.
Commissions in states such as Wyoming and Virginia do not have
jurisdiction over CRMS carriers. In those cases, the FCC makes the ETC
designation, establishing precedent for itself and for other states to follow
in making their own ETC designations.
The statutory guidance for ETC designation is limited. Section 254(e)
of the Act establishes that "only an eligible telecommunications carrier
designated under section 214(e) shall be eligible to receive specific Federal
universal service support. ''39 Pursuant to section 214(e)(1), a common
carrier designated as an ETC must offer and advertise the services
supported by the federal universal service mechanisms throughout the
designated service area. 40 Section 214(e)(2) establishes a final threshold
with a two-tier public interest test with differing standards for areas served• 41
by nonrural and rural telephone companies.
B. FCC Regulations and Decisions
The 1996 Telecommunications Act established a general framework
for regulation. The FCC and state commissions were bequeathed the
responsibility of filling in the particulars through both regulatory and
rulemaking authority and quasi-judicial decision making authority. The
FCC has developed rules applying to universal service and ETC
designation.
1. Early FCC Decision: Western Wireless Wyoming Decision
The seminal FCC ETC designation of a wireless provider was the
ETC designation for Western Wireless in 2000 in Wyoming.42 Until the
2004 decisions, this case provided the primary precedent for state
commissions. Western Wireless, a CMRS provider, sought and received an
ETC designation from the FCC. In considering the Western Wireless
application, the FCC clearly opened the door for universal service support
for wireless companies when it stated:
[W]e reject the implication that service offered by CMRS providers is
ineligible for universal service support. In the Universal Service Order,
the Commission concluded that universal service support mechanisms
and rules should be competitively neutral. The Commission concluded
that the principle of competitive neutrality includes technological
39. Id. § 254(e).
40. Id. § 214(e)(1).
41. Id. § 214(e)(2).
42. Western Wireless Order, supra note 2, para. 5.
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neutrality. Thus, a common carrier using any technology, including
CMRS, may qualify for designjion so long as it complies with the
section 214(e) eligibility criteria.
In a short opinion, the FCC found that Western Wireless had met "all
the requirements set forth in sections 214(e)(1) and (e)(6) to be designated
as an ETC ... for the designated service areas in the state of Wyoming."
4 4
The company offered the services required through a combination of its
own facilities and resale of other carrier's facilities and it committed to
advertise these services.4 5 The FCC found the designation of Western
Wireless as an additional ETC in "areas served by rural telephone
companies serves the public interest by promoting competition and the
provision of new technologies to consumers in high-cost and rural areas of
Wyoming."
4 6
In weighing the public interest requirement, the FCC established a
minimal standard. The FCC stated that it could find no empirical evidence
on the record to support the contention that designating Western Wireless
as an ETC in the rural service areas would harm consumers. 47 It concluded
that consumers in those service areas would instead benefit from
"competitive service and new technologies."
4 8
The FCC agreed with Western Wireless's argument that competition
will result in the deployment of new facilities and technologies as well as
provide an incentive for incumbent rural telephone companies to improve
their networks, thus improving service for Wyoming customers.
4 9
Specifically, the FCC found "that the provision of competitive service will
facilitate universal service to the benefit of consumers in Wyoming by
creating incentives to ensure that quality services are available at 'just,




In continuing its public interest analysis, the FCC briefly described
several factual findings. It found that Western Wireless was financially
stable,5 1 rural ILECs were not likely to withdraw from service areas•. 52
because of competition, and Western Wireless offered a local calling area
that in many cases was larger than that of the incumbent, potentially
43. Id. para. 11.
44. Id. para. 7.
45. Id. paras. 8, 14, 15.
46. Id. para. 1.
47. Id. para. 16.
48. Id.
49. Id. para. 17.
50. Id.
51. See id. para. 19.
52. Id. para. 20.
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reducing the number of intraLATA toll calls for consumers. 53 The FCC
recognized "that some rural areas may in fact be incapable of sustaining
more than one ETC," but stated that in the current case no evidence
demonstrating this had been provided for the requested service areas.54
In many areas of the law, a four-year-old decision would be
considered an infant, one that is still subject to examination, reflection, and
maturity. In the world of twenty-first century telecommunications in which
technologies, service packages, markets, and financial bottom lines shift
quarterly, a four-year-old decision interpreting an eight-year-old law is
virtually an octogenarian. This decision opened the door for wireless
providers to seek ETC status-and the rush began. By the time that the
FCC would announce two ETC cases in 2004, pressure on the USF and
objections from ILECs and others, would cause the FCC to provide
substantially greater specificity and a tighter framework for designation of
ETCs.
2. Texas Office of Public Utility Counsel v. FCC
Major legislation establishing new regulatory frameworks typically
results in legal challenges and judicial interpretation. This was the case
with the 1996 Telecommunications Act. Texas Office of Public Utility
Counsel v. FCC is a case in which the universal service funding and
distribution framework was challenged. 55 Of particular relevance to this
Article is that in this case, several states and Southwestern Bell challenged
the FCC's interpretation of section 214(e) as too narrow and restrictive of
the ability of state commissions to set their own criteria and to exercise
their own discretion over a carrier's eligibility.
56
After applying rules of statutory construction, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that "[n]othing in the statute, under this reading of the plain
language, speaks at all to whether the FCC may prevent state commissions
from imposing additional criteria on eligible carriers."5 7 The court noted in
a footnote that there are limitations to additional criteria stating"to be sure,
if a state commission imposed such onerous eligibility requirements that no
otherwise eligible carrier could receive designation, that state commission
would probably run afoul of § 214(e)(2)'s mandate to 'designate' a carrier
or 'designate more than one carrier.
53. Id. para. 21.
54. Id. para. 22.
55. Texas Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 418 (5th Cir. 1999).
56. See id.
57. Id. at 419.
58. Id. at 418 n.31.
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Based upon this holding, states-through statutory action or
regulatory processes and the FCC through its own regulatory processes-
have the ability to impose additional eligibility requirements beyond the
minimum standards of the 1996 Telecommunications Act.
V. VIRGINIA CELLULAR AND HIGHLAND CELLULAR
DESIGNATIONS
The FCC's recent decisions regarding Virginia Cellular's eligibility
for ETC status in January 2004 and Highland Cellular's eligibility in April
2004 have helped to clarify contested ETC issues for the benefit of state
commissions and the telecommunications industry (and ideally consumers).
In Virginia Cellular, the FCC specifically pointed to the precedential value
of its decision when it stated, "[t]he framework enunciated in this Order
shall apply to all ETC designations for rural areas pending further action by
the Commission."
59
A. Offer and Advertise Services
1. Offer Services
The FCC has defined the services that are to be supported by the
federal universal service support mechanisms. These services include:
(1) Voice grade access to the public switched network.... (2) Local
usage.... (3) Dual tone multi-frequency signaling or its functional
equivalent.... (4) Single-party service or its functional equivalent....
(5) Access to emergency services [including 911 and enhanced
911].... (6) Access to operator services.... (7) Access to
interexchange services.... (8) Access to directory assistang .... and
(9) Toll limitation for qualifying low-income consumers....
The 1996 Telecommunications Act authorizes states to "adopt
regulations not inconsistent with the Commission's rules to preserve and
advance universal service." 61 A state may add additional definitions or
standards as long as they do not burden federal universal support
mechanisms.62
The FCC, in Virginia Cellular, emphasized that services do not have
to exist when an applicant company applies. Such a requirement would
have "the effect of prohibiting the ability of prospective entrants from
providing telecommunications service.' The FCC acknowledged its
59. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18, para. 4.
60. 47 C.F.R. § 54.101(a) (2004).
61. 47 U.S.C. § 254(f) (2000).
62. Id.
63. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18, para. 17.
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previous statement that "a new entrant cannot reasonably be expected to be
able to make the substantial financial investment required to provide the
supported services in high-cost areas without some assurance that it will be
eligible for federal universal service support. ' 64 In order to prevent ETC
certification from serving as a barrier to entry, "a new entrant can make a
reasonable demonstration ... of its capability and commitment to provide
universal service without the actual provision of the proposed service.
65
In Virginia Cellular, the FCC applied the applicant's facts to the
regulatory structure. It acknowledged that Virginia Cellular is an "A-Band"
cellular carrier that
provides all of the services and functionalities enumerated in section
54.101(a) of the Commission's rules throughout its cellular service
area in Virginia. Virginia Cellular certifies that it has the capability to
offer voice-grade access to the public switched network, and the
functional equivalents to DTMF signaling, single-party service, access
to operator services, access to interexchange services, access to
directory a istance, and toll limitation for qualifying low-income
consumers.
The FCC also stated the following:
Virginia Cellular also complies with applicable law and Commission
directives on providing access to emergency services. In addition,
although the Commission has not set a minimum local usage
requirement, Virginia Cellular certifies it will comply with "any and all
minimum local usage requirements adopted by the FCC" and it intends
to offer uTumber of local calling plans as part of its universal service
offering.
Further, demonstrating its intent that applicants will actually deliver what
they have promised, the FCC noted that "Virginia Cellular has committed
to report annually its progress in achieving its build-out plans at the same
time it submits its annual certification required under sections 54.313 and
54.314 of the Commission's rules."
68
The FCC performed an almost identical fact analysis in Highland
Cellular and arrived at the same conclusion based upon the petitioning
company's offerings.69 In both determinations, the FCC imposed as
ongoing conditions the commitments the companies made on the record in
this proceeding and stated that these conditions will ensure that each
64. Id. para. 13 (citation omitted).
65. Id. para. 17.
66. Id. para. 14 (citations omitted).
67. Id. (citations omitted).
68. Id. (citations omitted).
69. Highland Cellular Order, supra note 28, para. 15.
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company "satisfies its obligations under section 214(e) of the Act.",70 In
Virginia Cellular, the FCC noted that an ETC can provide the services by
either "using its own facilities or a combination of its own facilities and
resale of another carrier's services."7
1
In Virginia Cellular, the FCC rejected "the argument of the Virginia
Rural Telephone Companies that Virginia Cellular does not offer all of the
services supported by the federal universal service support." 72 The rural
telephone companies unsuccessfully argued the following:
Virginia Cellular[] (1) has not yet upgraded from analog to digital and
until this [upgrade occurs], Virginia Cellular cannot effectively
implement E-911 or the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act (CALEA); (2) offers no local usage; (3) has stated
that its customers will not have equal access to interexchange carriers;(4) states only that it will participate "as required" with respect to
Lifeline service; and (5) has wireless signals that are sporadic or
unavailable in sor of the mountainous regions that Virginia Cellular
proposes to serve.
Virginia Cellular was able to satisfy the FCC by stating that it is
upgrading to digital technology, complies with state and federal 911
mandates, will provide multiple local usage plans, and is committed to
participating in Lifeline and Linkup programs after being designated an
ETC. 7The FCC affirmed that "Section 54.101 (a)(7) of the rules states that
one of the supported services is access to interexchange services, not equal
access to those services." 75 As Virginia Cellular stated that it provides
access to interexchange services, the FCC determined that it satisfied this
requirement. 76 The FCC pointed out that dead spots are acknowledged by
the Commission's rules, that Virginia Cellular is committed to using its
ETC support to upgrade its services, 78 and that "Virginia Cellular will
annually submit information detailing how many requests for service from
potential customers in the designated service areas were unfulfilled for the
past year."
' 79
The FCC accepted in both Virginia Cellular and Highland Cellular,
the commitment of the wireless providers "to become a signatory to the
70. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18, paras. 4, 46.
71. Id. para. 24 (citing § 47 U.S.C. 214(e)(l)(A) (2000)).
72. Id. para. 18 (citation omitted).
73. Id. (citations omitted).
74. Id. paras. 18-20, 22.
75. Id. para. 21 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 54.101(a)(7) (2004)).
76. Id.
77. Id. para. 23.
78. Id. para. 44.
79. Id. para. 46.
[Vol. 57
Number 3] VIRGINIA AND HIGHLAND CELLULAR FRAMEWORK 525
Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association's Consumer Code for
Wireless Service and provide the number of consumer complaints per
1,000 mobile handsets on an annual basis." 8° While compliance with this
code is not required by statute or regulation, it appears that the FCC has
identified that a company's commitment to comply is evidence of an intent
to provide the services established by the FCC.
8 r
2. Advertise Services
The 1996 Telecommunications Act requires that ETCs must
"advertise the availability of such [supported] services and the charges
therefore using media of general distribution." 82 In both the Virginia
Cellular and Highland cases, the FCC accepted the company's
commitment to advertise their supported services. 83 The FCC wrote
approvingly of Virginia Cellular's additional plans to advertise the
availability of its services. The company committed that it would promote
its services and Lifeline and Linkup discounts at local unemployment,
social security, and welfare offices for the benefit of unserved consumers.
84
Virginia Cellular also committed "to publicize locally the construction of
all new facilities in unserved or underserved areas so customers are made
aware of improved service.
85
The FCC reaffirmed its statement on advertising and its belief in
market power from earlier decisions. It stated that "because an ETC
receives universal service support only to the extent that it serves
customers, we believe that strong economic incentives exist, in addition to
the statutory obligation, for an ETC to advertise its universal service
offering in its designated service area."86
In sum, if a potential ETC commits to advertise its supported services
to the public, and particularly targets the unserved public, it will likely
meet the advertising requirement.
3. Service Area
The definition of service area is important in designating an ETC for
multiple reasons. A service provider can only receive universal support for
80. Id. para. 46; Highland Cellular Order, supra note 28, para. 43.
81. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18, para. 46. See also 47 C.F.R. § 54.101(a)
(2004).
82. 47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(1)(B) (2000).
83. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18, para. 25; Highland Cellular Order, supra
note 27, para. 7.
84. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18, para. 25.
85. Id.
86. Id. (citing Western Wireless Order, supra note 2, para. 10).
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subscribers in areas it is designated as an ETC. An ETC has a responsibility
to provide the supported services throughout its defined ETC areas. The
definition of "service area" is statutorily provided.87 The statute addresses
nonrural and rural areas differently. A state commission may define
nonrural service areas, with some flexibility, as "a geographic area
established by a State commission... for the purpose of determining
universal service obligations and support mechanisms."' 88 Service areas
served by rural telephone companies are presumed to be the company's
study area "unless and until the Commission and the States, after taking
into account recommendations of a Federal-State Joint Board ... establish
a different definition of service area for such company."' 89
In Virginia Cellular and in Highland Cellular, the CRMS company
sought ETC designation in several service areas. In both cases, the
petitioning company sought designation in only parts of areas served by
rural telephone companies. The FCC stated that in order for it to approve
an ETC in a service area that is smaller than the affected rural telephone
company study areas, the FCC was required to redefine the service areas of
the rural telephone companies in concert with state commissions and the
recommendations of the Joint Board. 90 The FCC took into account the Joint
Board's concerns regarding rural telephone company service areas as
discussed in the 1996 Recommended Decision.9 1 These concerns included
"(1) minimizing creamskimming; (2) recognizing that the 1996 Act places
rural telephone companies on a different competitive footing from other
LECs; and (3) recognizing the administrative burden of requiring rural
telephone companies to calculate costs at something other than a study area,,92
level. The FCC transformed these three concerns into a three-factor test
93which it applied in both cases. First, the FCC found that the there was
"little likelihood of rural creamskimming effects." 94 Second, the FCC
considered the rural telephone providers and pointed out that the
incumbents would lose no universal service funding due to the
designations. 95 Third, the FCC found "that redefining the rural telephone
87. 47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(5) (2000).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18, para. 41.
91. Id.
92. Id. (citing Recommended Decision, supra note 22, paras. 172-74 (1996)).
93. Id. paras. 42-44; Highland Cellular Order, supra note 28, paras. 39-41.
94. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 17, para 42; Highland Cellular Order, supra
note 28, para. 39.
95. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 17, para 43; Highland Cellular Order, supra
note 28, para. 40. If the Joint Board recommendation of supporting only one line per
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company service areas as proposed will not require the rural telephone
companies to determine their costs on a basis other than the study area
level." 96 Based upon these findings, in both Virginia Cellular and Highland
Cellular, the FCC was willing to redefine a service area in which a cellular
company was only licensed to serve part of the area. The redefined service
area would fit the CRMS' licensed area.
9 7
4. Public Interest Test
The 1996 Telecommunications Act requires that an ETC designation
be "consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity." 98 The
statute further requires that "[b]efore designating an additional eligible
telecommunications carrier for an area served by a rural telephone
company, the State commission shall find that the designation is in the
public interest."99 The FCC, in Virginia Cellular and in Highland Cellular,
emphasized that "in determining whether the public interest is served, the
Commission places the burden of proof upon the ETC applicant."'
00
The term rural telephone company is also defined statutorily.
l01
Under this statutory definition, rural telephone companies are incumbent
LECs that either serve study areas with fewer than 100,000 access lines or
meet one of three alternative criteria.l°2 The term nonrural carrier refers to
incumbent LECs that do not meet the statutory definition of a rural
telephone company.103
In Virginia Cellular, the FCC stated "that the Bureau previously has
found designation of additional ETCs in areas served by nonrural telephone
companies to be per se in the public interest based upon a demonstration
that the requesting carrier complies with the statutory eligibility obligations
residence is adopted by the Commission and if a forward looking modeled universal service
cost structure is adopted in the future, incumbent companies may be impacted. At the time
of the Virginia Cellular and Highland Cellular designations, the universal service structure
was such that incumbent local telephone companies would lose no universal service support
with the designation of additional ETCs.
96. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18, para. 44; Highland Cellular Order, supra
note 27, para. 41.
97. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18, para 45; Highland Cellular Order, supra
note 27, para. 42.
98. 47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(2) (2000).
99. Id.
100. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18, para 26; Highland Cellular Order, supra
note 28, para. 20.
101. 47 U.S.C. § 153(a)(37) (2000).
102. Id.
103. See id.
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of section 214(e)(1) of the Act."' 104
In making this per se determination, the FCC has acknowledged the
1996 Telecommunication Act's emphasis upon competition. Areas served
by nonrural companies are typically served by Bell Operating Companies
("BOCs") who are well positioned to compete with newcomers. These
areas are likely to be economically attractive areas for competition. A
substantial portion, if not a majority, of the lines in service areas served by
nonrural telephone companies are likely to be ineligible for universal
service support. However, while the FCC has established a presumption for
designation of additional ETCs in areas served by nonrural telephone
companies, the presumption is not absolute. The FCC observed in Virginia
Wireless, "designation of an additional ETC in a nonrural telephone
company's study area based merely upon a showing that the requesting
carrier complies with section 214(e)(1) of the Act will necessarily be
consistent with the public interest in every instance."' 10 5
The FCC left unstated the circumstances in which it would not be in
the public interest to designate an additional ETC in a nonrural telephone
company's service area. It appears that a weighing of multiple factors can
possibly tip this scale. These factors might include: blatant creamskimming
and avoidance of high-cost areas, the previous entry of one or more CETC,
an ILEC which does not qualify as a rural provider but which serves lightly
populated rural territories, public opposition to designation, and a
questionable quality of service record by the petitioner.106
In considering the public interest for nonrural areas in both Virginia
Cellular and Highland Cellular, the FCC in both cases pointed to the
petitioners' commitments to providing quality services and the lack of
opposition to designation in those areas. These two considerations were
enough to satisfy the public interest test for areas served by nonrural
telephone companies. 10
Congress and the FCC raised the bar significantly higher in
considering the public interest in areas served by rural telephone
104. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18, para. 27 (citing Federal-State Joint Bd. on
Universal Serv., Cellco P'ship, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 39 (2000)).
105. Id.
106. A factor adding to the unlikelihood of the disapproval of an ETC applicant in a
nonrural area is that the regional BOCs under section 271 of the Federal
Telecommunications Act need to show competition in their local service area as one factor
in receiving approval to enter interLATA long distance service. A regional BOC would have
a difficult time objecting to the entry of a CETC. There are a few nonBell, nonrural local
telephone companies who do serve highly rural areas.
107. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18, para. 27; Highland Cellular Order, supra
note 28, para. 21.
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companies. In both of the recent cases, the FCC considered "whether the
benefits of an additional ETC in the wire centers for which [a competitor]
seeks designation outweigh any potential harms."' 10 8 It emphasized that
"this balancing of benefits and harms is a fact-specific exercise."
109
5. Public Interest Factors
The FCC identified the facts to be weighed in this balancing act,
stating as follows:
[i]n determining whether designation of a competitive ETC in a rural
telephone company's service area is in the public interest, we weigh
the benefits of increased competitive choice, the impact of the
designation on the universal service fund, the unique advantages and
disadvantages of the competitor's service offering, any commitments
made regarding quality of telephone service, and the competitive
ETC's ability to satisfy its obligatiop o serve the designated service
areas within a reasonable time frame.
In identifying these factors, the FCC recognized that the Joint Board
would soon be releasing its recommended order and warned that it did not
want to prejudge the Joint Board's deliberations. It noted that, in following
the Joint Board's work, it "may adopt a different framework for the public
interest analysis of ETC applications." II
6. Benefits of Access and Mobility
In considering the public interest benefits for areas served by rural
telephone companies, in both Virginia Cellular and Highland Cellular, the
FCC pointed to the fact that some customers will be served who do not
have access to a wireline telephone. It identified several additional benefits,
specifically:
[Tihe mobility of Virginia Cellular's wireless service will provide
other benefits to consumers. For example, the mobility of
telecommunications assists consumers in rural areas who often must
drive significant distances to places of employment, stores, schools,
and other critical community locations. In addition, the availability of a
wireless universal service offering provides access to emergency
services that can mitigate the unique rislH2of geographic isolation
associated with living in rural communities.
108. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18, para. 28; Highland Cellular Order, supra
note 28, para. 22.
109. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18, para 28.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18, para. 29. See also Highland Cellular Order,
supra note 28, para 23.
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7. Benefit of Larger Local Calling Area
In both cases, the FCC also identified as a benefit the fact that the
cellular company's local calling area was larger than that of the ILECs the
cellular companies compete against. This will result in fewer toll calls for
the cellular company's customers. 113
8. Service Quality Disadvantage of Wireless Providers
The FCC acknowledged in both cases that "arguments in the record
that wireless telecommunications offerings may be subject to dropped calls
and poor coverage." 114 It also recognized that "[p]arties also have noted
that wireless carriers often are not subject to mandatory service quality
standards." 115 In both cases, the cellular companies commnitted to
mitigating these concerns. In order to offer evidence of commitment to
high-quality service, the companies committed to comply with the Cellular
Telecommunications Industry Association Consumer Code for Wireless
Service, and to provide the FCC "with the number of consumer complaints
per 1,000 handsets on an annual basis."' 116 Additionally, Virginia Cellular
assured the FCC that it would "alleviate dropped calls by using universal
service support to build new towers and facilities to offer better
coverage.
9. Disadvantageous Impact on the Universal Service Fund
In Virginia Cellular and Highland Cellular, the FCC considered the
impact of granting ETC status on the USF and determined that the grant of
the specific ETC status "will not dramatically burden the universal service
fund."1 18 However, in both cases, the FCC expressed its concern that "the
amount of high-cost support distributed to competitive ETCs is growing at
a dramatic pace.' ' 119T The FCC acknowledged the arguments of
commentators who propose that designations of competitive ETCs will
place significant burdens on federal universal service without
113. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18, para. 29; Highland Cellular Order, supra
note 28, para. 23.
114. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18, para. 30. See also Highland Cellular Order,
supra note 28, para. 24.
115. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18, para. 30. See also Highland Cellular Order,
supra note 28, para. 24.
116. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18, para. 30; Highland Cellular Order, supra
note 28, para. 24.
117. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18, para. 30.
118. Id. at para 31; Highland Cellular Order, supra note 28, para. 25.
119. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18, para 31; Highland Cellular Order, supra
note 28, para. 25.
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corresponding benefits. It stated that it has asked the Joint Board to
examine the "rules relating to high-cost universal service support in service
areas in which a competitive ETC is providing service, as well as the
Commission's rules regarding support for second lines,"'120 but declined to
take action or to establish a precedent in deciding these issues in the cases
at hand.
10. Rural Public Interest Test and Creamskimming
The next step in the FCC's public interest analysis in both Virginia
Cellular and Highland Cellular was to consider whether the company
would be creamskimming. "'Creamskimming' refers to the practice of
targeting only the customers that are the least expensive to serve, thereby
undercutting the ILEC's ability to provide service throughout the area. 1Y
In Virginia Cellular, the FCC recognized that the contour of the company's
licensed area differed from the existing rural telephone companies' study
areas and that "[g]enerally, a request for ETC designation for an area less
than the entire study area of a rural telephone company might raise
concerns that the petitioner intends to creamskim in the rural study
area. 122 However, because Virginia Cellular committed to provide
universal service throughout its licensed service area, the FCC determined
that Virginia Cellular was not "deliberately seeking to enter only certain•• ,,123
portions of these companies' study areas in order to creamskim. The
FCC acknowledged:
[a]t the same time, we recognize that, for reasons beyond a competitive
carrier's control, the lowest cost portion of a rural study area may be
the only portion of the study area that a wireless carrier's license
covers. Under these circumstances, granting a carrier ETC designation
for only its licensed portion of the rural stuqY4area may have the same
effect on the ILEC as rural creamskimming.
Therefore, the FCC determined it would not be in the public interest to
designate Virginia Cellular as an ETC in a study area in which it would
only be serving the lowest-cost, highest-density wire center. 1
25
Similarly, in Highland Cellular, while the FCC approved areas fully
served by Highland Cellular and some areas only partially covered due to
120. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18, para. 31; Highland Cellular Order, supra
note 28, para 25.
121. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18, para. 32 n.102 (citation omitted). See also
Highland Cellular Order, supra note 28, para. 26.
122. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18, para. 32.
123. Id.
124. Id. para. 33.
125. Id. para. 35.
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licensing limits, the FCC excluded a study area from the company's ETC
designation due to creamskimming concerns. 126 It agreed with the
arguments of Verizon South that Highland Cellular should not be allowed
to serve only the low-cost customers in a rural telephone company's study
area and excluded this area from Highland Cellular's ETC designation.
In Highland Cellular, the FCC concluded that before designating a
competitor as an additional ETC in a rural telephone company's service
area, the company must commit to providing the supported services in the
designated area. The FCC emphasized:
[a] rural telephone company's wire center is an appropriate minimum
geographic area for ETC designation because rural carrier wire centers
typically correspond with county and/or town lines. We believe that
requiring a competitive ETC to serve entire communities will make it
less likely that the competitor will relinquish its ETC designation at a
later date. Because consumers in rural areas tend to have fewer
competitive alternatives than consumers in urban areas, such
consumers le more vulnerable to carriers relinquishing ETC
designation.
Highland Cellular previously stated before the FCC's decision that, if
the FCC imposed a requirement that competitive ETCs serve complete
rural telephone company wire centers, Highland Cellular would not seek
designation in a particular wire center. 129 The FCC, therefore, declined to
designate the company as an ETC for that wire center. 130
In an unusual footnote to discussions of the potential for
creamskimming in Highland Cellular, the FCC advised rural telephone
companies of a defensive strategy against creamskimming. The FCC
pointed out that in the Rural Task Force Order, it provided incumbent
LECs with options for disaggregating their study areas, effectively causing
uneconomic incentives for competitive entry. The FCC also provides
126. See Highland Cellular Order, supra note 28, para. 29.
127. Id. para. 32.
128. Id. para. 33.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. para. 32 n.96. The FCC further stated:
[u]nder disaggregation and targeting, per-line support is more closely associated
with the cost of providing service. There are fewer issues regarding inequitable
universal service support and concerns regarding the incumbent's ability to serve
its entire study area when there is in place a disaggregation plan for which the per-
line support available to a competitive ETC in the wire centers located in "low-
cost" zones is less than the amount a competitive ETC could receive if it served in
one of the wire centers located in the "high-cost" zones.... Although the deadline
(May 15, 2002) for carriers to file disaggregation plans has passed, the relevant
state commission or appropriate regulatory authority may nonetheless require a
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companies with the process and authority to implement this strategy. 32
11. Public Interest Test Summarized
To reiterate, in Virginia Cellular and Highland Cellular, the FCC's
determination of public interest rested upon the benefits of provision of
services to persons currently without service, the mobility offered by
wireless services, and the benefits of a larger local calling area. It
considered the disadvantages of the quality of wireless services, the impact
upon universal service funding, and the potential for creamskimming. The
potential for creamskimming appears to be the critical factor in this
relatively organic weighing of factors. In both decisions, while potential
providers were approved for ETC designation in several study areas, they
were denied approval for study areas which naturally lent themselves to
creamskimming. In both cases, the FCC carefully examined the
demographics of the study areas and the high- or low-cost nature of the
wire centers making up the partial portions of areas to be served by the
applicants. Regardless of whether the selection of service area was possibly
intentional due to strategy or unintentional due to factors such as limits on a
CRMS license area, the FCC demonstrated its skepticism of applications
intending to serve primarily more densely populated low-cost portions of a
study area.
B. Regulatory Oversight
The 1996 Telecommunications Act does not speak to reporting
requirements for ETCs. However, in both the Virginia Cellular and
Highland Cellular ETC determinations, the FCC emphasized
accountability and transparency. In a clear warning to wireless and cellular
ETCs, and perhaps as a rebuke to critiques of the licensing of these ETCs,
the FCC noted "that Virginia Cellular is obligated under section 254(e) of
the Act to use high-cost support 'only for the provision, maintenance, and
upgrading of facilities and services for which support is intended."'' 133 The
FCC additionally emphasized that its rules require the companies to certify
annually that they are in compliance with section 254(e) and that the
companies have "committed to submit records and documentation on an
carrier to disaggregate, either on its own motion or that of an interested party.
Id. (citations omitted).
132. Id.
133. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18, para. 46 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 254(e) (2000);
47 C.F.R. §§ 54.313, 54.314 (2004)); Highland Cellular Order, supra note 28, para. 43
(citing 47 U.S.C. § 254(e) (2000); 47 C.F.R. §§ 54.313, 54.314 (2004)).
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annual basis detailing [their] progress towards meeting build-out plans."
134
In both cases, the applicant companies "committed to become a signatory
to the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association's Consumer Code
for Wireless Service and provide the number of consumer complaints per
1,000 mobile handsets on an annual basis." 135 Finally, the FCC required
the wireless and cellular companies to "annually submit information
detailing how many requests for service from potential customers .... were
unfulfilled for the past year."' 136 The required reports must be submitted to
the FCC and USAC.
137
The FCC fired some parting shots over the bow as it concluded both
cases. The shots appear to be aimed at all ETCs generally as much as the
particular company seeking ETC status. The FCC noted that "the
Commission may institute an inquiry on its own motion to examine any
ETC's records and documentation to ensure that the high-cost support it
receives is being used 'only for the provision, maintenance, and upgradin
of facilities and services' in the areas where it is designated as an ETC."'
ETCs "will be required to provide such records and documentation to the
Commission and USAC upon request."' 39 The FCC further emphasized
that if an ETC fails to fulfill the requirements of the statute, FCC rules, or
the terms of an ETC designation order after it begins receiving universal
service support, the FCC has authority to revoke its ETC designation and
may assess forfeitures for violations of its rules and orders. 
140
VI. SEPARATE OPINIONS
The FCC commissioners accompanied the Virginia Cellular decision
with five separate statements-four concurring and one dissenting. The
number of opinions reflected the important precedent established in the
decision. In their individual opinions, each of the commissioners
134. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18, para. 46; Highland Cellular Order, supra
note 28, para. 43.
135. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18, para. 46; Highland Cellular Order, supra
note 28, para. 43.
136. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18, para. 46; Highland Cellular Order, supra
note 28, para. 43.
138. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18, para. 46; Highland Cellular Order, supra note
28, para. 43.
138. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18, para. 46 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 254(e) (2000);
47 C.F.R. §§ 54.313, 54.314 (2004)); Highland Cellular Order, supra note 28, at para. 43
(citing 47 U.S.C. § 254(e) (2000); 47 C.F.R. §§ 54.313, 54.314 (2004)).
139. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18, para. 46, Highland Cellular Order, supra
note 28, para. 43.
140. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18, para. 46; Highland Cellular Order, supra
note 28, para. 43.
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acknowledged the importance of impending recommendations of the Joint
Board.
Chairman Michael K. Powell emphasized his belief that
"[c]ompetition is for rural as well as urban consumers."141 He praised the
decision for recognizing the unique value that mobile services provided to
rural consumers in the public interest standard and for reinforcing "the
requirement that wireless networks be ready, willing and able to serve as
carriers of last resort to support our universal service goals."'142 Powell
further expressed that despite his emphasis upon competition and
competitively neutral support, the FCC had a responsibility to ensure that
increasing demands on the high cost fund not be allowed to threaten its
viability.
r43
Commissioner Kathleen Q. Abernathy applauded the Commission for
having "taken an important (albeit incremental) step toward establishing a
• • • ,,144
more rigorous framework for evaluating ETC applications. Abernathy
acknowledged that competition is a core goal under the 1996
Telecommunications Act, but urged that in rural study areas where the cost
of providing service substantially exceed retail rates, regulators should
weigh whether subsidizing additional ETCs is in the public interest. She
applauded requiring ETC's to submit build-out plans documenting use of
federal universal service funding and emphasized and emphasized the FCC
was "right to consider the increasing demands on the universal service
fund."
145
However, Commissioner Michael J. Copps stated that the FCC made
headway in Virginia Cellular toward "articulating a more rigorous template
for review of ETC applications."' 146 Copps expressed his belief "that the
ETC process needs further improvement." He specifically pointed to the
''consequences that flow from using the fund to support multiple
competitors in truly rural areas."
' 148
Commissioner Jonathan S. Adelstein applauded the order for
establishing "a better template for the ETC designation process that is a
significant improvement from past Commission decisions and that more




144. Id. (Kathleen Q. Abernathy, Comm'r, separate statement).
145. Id.
146. Id. (Michael J. Copps, Comm'r, separate statement).
147. Id.
148. Id.
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fully embraces the statutory public interest mandate."' 149 Adelstein noted
that he expected state commissions will also find the template to be useful
in their deliberations of ETC requests. He emphasized that the template
provides a much more stringent examination of the public interest in
making ETC determinations. 150 He noted approvingly that Virginia
Cellular "made significant investment and service quality commitments
throughout its proposed service areas." 
1 51
Commissioner Kevin J. Martin dissented. He objected to the "Order's
finding that the goals of universal service are to 'provide greater mobility'
and 'a choice' of providers in rural areas." 152 Martin emphasized that he
believed "the main goals of the universal service program are to ensure that
all consumers-including those in high cost areas have access at affordable
rates." 153 Martin expressed his concerns "with the Commission's policy of
using universal service support as a means of creating 'competition' in high
cost areas." 154 He was critical of subsidizing "multiple competitors to serve
areas in which costs are prohibitively expensive for even one carrier."
155
Martin was troubled by the decision's failure to require the same
obligations of CETC as incumbents. Specifically, he pointed to type and
quality of service, carrier of last resort, and equal access obligations.
Three commissioners supplied additional statements in Highland
Cellular. Commissioner Kevin J. Martin dissented and echoed his
statements in Virginia Cellular. Commissioner Michael J. Copps, however,
supported the decision and stated, "[t]he long-term viability of universal
service depends on a more rigorous review process for ETC
applications."' 156 He applauded the Highland Cellular and Virginia Cellular
cases as steps, but emphasized that as the FCC considers the Joint Board's
recommendations, it needs to further improve it, considering "the
consequences that flow from using the fund to support several competitors
in truly remote areas." 157 He also articulated his thoughts that when CETCs
are funded, the "rules must provide the right level of support."
158
Concurring, Commissioner Jonathan S. Adelstein stated that
Highland Cellular along with Virginia Cellular, "marks a significant
149. Id. (Jonathon S. Adelstein, Comm'r, separate statement).
150. Id.
151. Id.
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improvement from past Commission decisions by more fully embracing the
statutory public interest mandate"' 159 and examining it more stringently. He
also noted the FCC improved accountability in the process by requiring
ETC's to submit documentation of their progress towards meeting their
service commitments. 
160
Finally, he emphasized three reforms that could reduce fund growth
without short-changing rural America: first, reform of the process for
designating ETCs; second, "funding new entrants based upon their own
costs, instead of those of the incumbent"; and third, exploring frameworks
"to identify very high-cost areas where it would be prohibitive to fund
more than one ETC."'
161
VII. SUMMARY AND IMPACT OF VIRGINIA CELLULAR AND
HIGHLAND CELLULAR
The FCC appeared to have attempted a balancing act in Virginia
Cellular and Highland Cellular while at the same time it signaled
emphatically that it was anxiously awaiting the Joint Board
recommendations. The FCC reaffirmed that CRMS licensed
telecommunications companies can qualify for ETC status and that the
services required are only those defined by regulation for universal service
support. States can add additional services as long as they do not burden
federal universal support mechanisms. The FCC was emphatic that to
requiring services to exist when an applicant seeks ETC status has the
effect of prohibiting entrants. Entrants only are required to make a
reasonable demonstration of capability and commitment to provide the
required services. Advertising services in media of general distribution
appears to be a low hurdle for applicants. The FCC applauded
commitments to target unserved populations with advertising efforts.
In Virginia Cellular and Highland Cellular, the FCC provided
additional clarity to the process of defining service areas and emphasized
that a designated ETC must serve the entire designated area using either its
own or leased infrastructure. Perhaps, the most crucial clarification
provided by these cases is the analysis of public interest. The burden of
proof rests on the ETC applicant with a higher standard required for areas
served by rural telephone companies than for others. The FCC identified
and applied several factors in strengthening the public interest test used in
rural ETC designations. Some of these factors identified unique assets of
CRMS providers; however, the factor which received the greatest emphasis
159. Id. (Jonathan S. Adelstein, Comm'r, separate statement).
160. Id.
161. Id.
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was weighing the potential for creamskimming. The FCC emphasized that
universal service support must be used only for the provision, maintenance,
and upgrading of facilities and services for which support is intended. It
strengthened reporting requirements designed to ensure that universal
service funding is spent as intended-to assure all consumers-including
those in high-cost areas have access at affordable rates.
A. Joint Federal-State Board on Universal Service Recommended
Decision
The Joint Board's recommended 2004 decision "concerning the
process for designation of eligible telecommunications carriers (ETCs) and
the Commission's rules regarding high-cost universal service support" have
been anxiously awaited by differing industry factions, state commissions,
and even the FCC.' 62 In Virginia Cellular and Highland Cellular, the FCC
used the same language expressing its anticipation, stating "[iut is our hope
that the Commission's pending rulemaking proceeding also will provide a
framework for assessing the overall impact of competitive ETC
designations on the universal service mechanisms.' 163 The recommended
order was developed under pressure to balance the rapid growth of
universal funding of competitive ETCs with principles of universal service
and protection of the public interest.
On February 27, 2004, the Joint Board released the Recommended
Decision. To many readers, the Joint Board's Recommended Decision was
anticlimactic. It made a series of recommendations concerning the process
of designating ETCs, but these generally provide less clarity than the
FCC's Virginia Cellular and Highland Cellular ETC designations and its
language exhibits substantial political waffling and compromise. Its
clearest and most tangible recommendations regarding high-cost universal
support are controversial and may not be implemented by the FCC.
B. Justification of Permissive Federal Guidelines
The Joint Board recommended that the FCC adopt permissive federal
guidelines for the states to consider in ETC designation proceedings. The
guidelines would allow for a more predictable application process among
states, establish a rigorous designation process, and assure that only carriers
who are qualified, capable, and committed to providing universal service
would receive support.' 64
162. Joint Board Decision, supra note 22, para. 1.
163. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18, para. 31; Highland Cellular Order, supra
note 28, para. 25.
164. Joint Board Decision, supra note 22, para. 2.
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Based upon three arguments, the Joint Board justified the requirement
of rigorous reviews of ETC applications and a fact-intensive analysis. The
first argument was that "an ETC must be prepared to serve all customers
within a designated service area and must be willing to be the sole ETC
should other ETCs withdraw from the market." 165 The second argument
related to section 214(e)(2) of the 1996 Telecommunications Act that
"requires that designation of an additional ETC serve the public
interest." 166 Finally, the third argument was a "rigorous application process
ensures that consumers in all regions of the nation, including rural and low-
income consumers, have access to telecommunications services that are
reasonably comparable to services provided in urban areas."
167
C. Additional Minimum Eligibility Requirements
The Joint Board reviewed the mandatory federal statutory and
regulatory standards. Its analysis was much in line with the FCC's analysis
in Virginia Cellular. The Joint Board proposed additional minimum
eligibility standards for potential use by the FCC and state commissions. It
described these as tools that will assist states in ensuring that "additional
ETCs are able and willing to serve all customers in the designated service,,168
area upon reasonable request. It pointed to the Fifth Circuit decision,
Texas Office of Public Utility Counsel v. FCC, standing for the proposition
that states have the authority in designating ETCs to establish eligibility
requirements above and beyond section 213(e)(1) of the 1996
Telecommunications Act.1 69 These additional minimum requirements will
be addressed individually below.
1. Adequate Financial Resources
The Joint Board recommended "that the Commission adopt guidelines
encouraging states to evaluate whether ETC applicants have the financial
resources and ability to provide quality services throughout the designated
service area."170 The Joint Board justified this examination of the potential
long-term viability of ETC applicants based upon prudence and the public
interest of not supporting a financially unsound carrier who even with
165. Id. para. 11.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. para. 37.
169. Id. para. 10 n.17 (citing Texas Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393,
418 (5th Cir. 1999)).
170. Id. para. 22.
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universal support would still be unable to achieve long-term viability.1
These guidelines would examine a factor not considered by the FCC in
Virginia Cellular and Highland Cellular.
2. Commitment and Ability to Provide the Supported Services
In addition, the Joint Board recommended "that the Commission
adopt a guideline encouraging state commissions to require ETC applicants
to demonstrate their capability .and commitment to provide service
throughout the designated service area to all customers who make a
reasonable request for service." 172 Much of the discussion of this
recommendation is very consistent with the FCC's actions in Virginia
Cellular and Highland Cellular. Slipped into the discussion is the major
recommendation that the FCC
adopt guidelines encouraging states, as a condition of ETC
designation, to require corimetitive ETCs to be prepared to provide
equal access if all other ETCs in that service area exercise their rights
to relinquish their designations pursuant to section 214(e)(4). Under
section 214(e)(4), when an ETC seeks to relinquish its ETC
designation, the state commission Will require the remaining ETC or
ETCs tm7 erve the customers that had been served by the relinquishing
carrier.
Requiring ETCs to provide equal access to interexchange long
distance carriers is a significant policy decision. In Virginia Cellular, the
FCC rejected the claim that ETC designation should be denied because the
cellular company's customers would not have equal access to
interexchange carriers. 174 It noted in its decision that in 2002, four
members of the Joint Board recommended adding equal access as a
supported service. The Commission decided to defer consideration of the
issue pending resolution of its proceeding examining the rules addressing
high-cost universal service support in competitive areas.175
The requirement that ETCs "be prepared to provide equal access"
appears to be a compromise position.1 76 The Joint Board stopped short of
requiring that ETCs offer equal access as a condition for approval as an
ETC. The recommendation would allow an ETC time to ramp-u p after
notification that it would become the sole ETC in the service area.
171. Id.
172. Id. para. 23.
173. Id. para. 28.
174. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 17, para. 21.
175. Id. para. 21 n.64.
176. Joint Board Decision, supra note 21, para. 28.
177. See id. para. 23.
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The Joint Board acknowledged that the FCC did not resolve whether
to include equal access in the definition of supported services, but the Joint
Board acknowledged, but it justified this recommendation as a consumer
protection issue. It argued "that this recommended guideline will protect
consumers in the event of relinquishment by ensuring that consumers will
continue to have equal access to long distance providers, without imposing
any unnecessary administrative burdens on the remaining ETC or
ETCs."'178 The Joint Board may have been subtly pointing out a fairness or
a competitive neutrality issue when it noted that incumbent LECs are
required by statute to provide equal access.179 As the Joint Board, not the
FCC is the "speaker" or author of this report, I believe it should be the
active noun leading the sentence. Perhaps, the amended wording will
provide clarity.
3. Ability to Remain Functional in Emergencies
The Joint Board recommended that the FCC "adopt a guideline
encouraging states to require ETC applicants to demonstrate the ability to
remain functional in emergency situations."180 It quoted a commentator
who argued that the "security of a carrier's network and the ability to
protect critical telecommunications infrastructure should be a major
consideration in evaluating the public interest."' 181 The Joint Board used, as
an illustration, the State of Vermont Public Service Board's use of this
factor in analyzing the public interest. 182 What appears to have been
unstated is that landline services are robust. Due to their design and
redundancy features, they do not require the electrical grid in order to
operate in an emergency and they are not generally susceptible to adverse
weather or terrorist sabotage. During the Cold War, telecommunications
central offices were generally constructed to standards that would allow
them to serve as fallout shelters. Cellular and wireless systems have not
generally been built to the same resilient standards. There are legitimate
public policy reasons to assure networks have this level of functionality and
conversely, such standards may exclude some wireless providers from ETC
designation. This guideline would extend beyond those considered in
Virginia Cellular or Highland Cellular.
178. Id. atpara. 28.
179. Id. para. 28 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 251(g) (2000)).
180. Id. para. 30.
181. Id. (citation omitted).
182. Id.
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4. Consumer Protection
The Joint Board recommended "that the Commission adopt a
guideline indicating that state commissions may properly impose consumer
protection requirements as part of the ETC designation process."'183 This
recommendation is consistent with commitments obtained by the FCC in
granting ETC approval in Virginia Cellular and Highland Cellular.184 In
both cases, the petitioning companies committed to comply with the
Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association Consumer Code for
Wireless Service and to provide the FCC with the number of consumer
complaints per 1000 handsets on an annual basis. 185 The Joint Board did
qualify its recommendation. It cautioned that "[s]tates should not require
regulatory parity for parity's sake. Rather, requirements should be imposed
on ETCs only to the extent necessary to further universal service goals,




In addition, the Joint Board recommended that "[c]onsistent with the
requirement that ETCs offer local usage, states may consider how much
local usage ETCs should offer as a condition of federal universal service
support." 87 The Joint Board pointed to the fact that local usage is "one of
the supported services that ETCs are required to provide in order to receive
federal universal service." 188 The local usage requirement was discussed by
the FCC in Virginia Cellular and Highland Cellular and in both cases, the
companies agreed to "comply with any and all minimum local usage
requirements adopted by the FCC."'189 While companies have agreed to
comply with an FCC standard, the FCC has not established a minimum
amount of local usage to be required as part of a basic package of
supported services. In this vacuum, the Joint Board points to the state
commission's authority to establish standards as acknowledged by the Fifth190-
Circuit in Texas Office of Public Utility Counsel v. FCC. With statutory
183. Id. para. 31.
184. See Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18; Highland Cellular Order, supra note
28.
185. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18, para. 30; Highland Cellular Order, supra
note 28, para. 24.
186. Joint Board Decision, supra note 22, para. 34.
187. Id. para. 35.
188. Id.
189. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18, para. 20; Highland Cellular Order, supra
note 28, para. 15.
190. Joint Board Decision, supra note 22, para. 35 (citing Texas Office of Pub. Util.
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authority affirmed by the courts, the Joint Board suggests that states
establish minimum local usage requirements.
D. Public Interest Determinations
Like the FCC in its Virginia Cellular and Highland Cellular
decisions, the Joint Board emphasized that an ETC applicant must meet the
public interest requirements of section 214(e)(2) of the Act and
acknowledged that Congress did not establish specific criteria to be
applied. 191 Rather than endorsing or otherwise critiquing the FCC's
analysis in Virginia Cellular and Highland Cellular, the Joint Board
discussed the manner in which states have applied the public interest test
and the factors that states have considered in making the public interestd .. 192
decisions.19
As examples, the Joint Board used the elements identified by the
Alaska Commission. The Alaska Commission considered "new choices for
customers; affordability; quality of service; service to unserved customers;
comparison of benefits to public cost; and considerations of material
harm." 193 The Joint Board pointed out that the FCC in its early decision
similarly considered "whether consumers were likely to benefit from
increased competition; whether the additional designation will provide
benefits not available from incumbent carriers; whether consumers may be
harmed should the incumbent withdraw from the service area; and whether
there would be harm to a rural incumbent LEC.
194
In weighing the public interest, the FCC examined whether an
additional designation would provide consumers benefits not available
from incumbent carriers, noted the Joint Board. Examples cited included an
ETC applicant providing a wider local calling area than that offered by the
incumbent, and a variety of calling plans which would make intrastate toll
calls more affordable to consumers. 195 In examining the issue of public
interest, the Joint Board also described the FCC's previous creamskimming
analysis in the RCC Holdings Order,196 which clearly was extended in
Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 418 (5th Cir. 1999)).
191. Id. para. 39.
192. Id.
193. Id. para. 40 (citation omitted).
194. Id. (citing Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Western Wireless Corp.,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 18,133 (2001). See also Federal State Joint
Bd. on Universal Serv., RCC Holdings, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 17 F.C.C.R.
23,532 [hereinafter RCC Holdings Order].
195. Joint Board Decision, supra note 22, para. 41 (citations omitted).
196. Id. para. 41 (citing RCC Holdings Order, supra note 194, paras. 24, 27-31).
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Virginia Cellular and Highland Cellular. 1
9 7
The Joint Board was very direct in rejecting the suggestion from
commentators who urged that it encourage commissions to "adopt a
specific cost-benefit test for the purpose of making public interest
determinations."198 The Joint Board explained
[w]hile we agree that a consideration of both benefits and costs is
inherent in conducting a public interest analysis, we decline to provide
any more specific guidance on how this balancing should be
performed. We believe that the difficulty of quantifying and weighing
the various factors that may be relevant to determining the public
interest militate against at e1pting to create a rigid formula for
balancing costs and benefits.
In weighing the public interest, the Joint Board did identify a
quantifiable factor that it described as "concrete, objective, transparent, and
readily obtainable." 200 It believes that "public interest determinations may
properly consider the level of federal high-cost per-line support to be
received by ETCs."201 The Joint Board reasoned that "[i]f the per-line
support is high enough, the state may be justified in limiting the number of
ETCs in that study area, because funding multiple ETCs in such areas
could impose strains on the universal service fund. ' 2°2 It also reasoned:
[pier-line support is a single "marker" that encompasses various
underlying factors that may impact the determination of whether it is in
the public interest to have an additional subsidized carrier entering a
carrier's study area.., such as topography, population density, line
density, disa ce between wire centers, loop lengths and levels of
investment.
While the Joint Board recommended that per-line support be used as a
marker, it declined to adopt specific benchmarks based on per-line support
that would be used in making public interest determinations.204 Instead, it
recommended that the FCC "solicit comment on whether such national
benchmarks merit additional consideration. '' 205 Use of per-line supportwould expand the examination used by the FCC in ETC designations.
197. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18, para. 32; Highland Cellular Order, supra
note 28, at para. 26.
198. Joint Board Decision, supra note 22, para. 42.
199. Id.




204. Id. para. 44.
205. Id.
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E. Applicability to Existing ETCs and Rescinding of ETC Status
On the potentially politically and legally explosive issue of the
applicability of the proposed guidelines to ETCs that have already been
designated, the Joint Board recommended that the FCC seek comment.
206
The Joint Board expressed its belief that ETC determinations can be
rescinded for failure to comply with section 214(e) of the 1996
Telecommunications Act and conditions imposed upon them by the states
(apparently imposed when designated).207 The Joint Board suggested that
the FCC consider "whether states should allow ETCs some reasonable
transition period to bring their operations into compliance with any new
state ETC requirements." 208 The Joint Board also suggested that the FCC
consider grandfathering ETC designation for a period of time "to avoid
significant market disruptions. ' 2°9 This set of recommendations appears to
raise the issue of applicability of the new guidelines to existing ETCs, but
does not begin to resolve the issue.
F. Annual Certification Requirement
The Joint Board recommended that the annual certification process
for all ETCs be used to ensure "that federal universal service support is
used to provide the supported services and for associated infrastructure
costs... [making] this recommendation in order to ensure the
accountability of all ETCs for proper use of funds." 210 The Joint Board also
suggested that states examine compliance with build-out plans. These
recommendations are consistent with the FCC's rules and the additional
commitments the FCC obtained from carriers seeking ETC designation in
Virginia Cellular and Highland Cellular.21 1 If the annual certification
process shows that an ETC fails to comply with the federal or state
requirements, the Joint Board expressed that "the state commission may
decline to grant an annual certification or may rescind a certification
granted previously."
212




210. Id. para. 46.
211. See Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18, para. 46; Highland Cellular Order,
supra note 28, para. 43.
212. Joint Board Decision, supra note 22, para. 48.
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G. Service Area Redefinition Process and Rural Carrier
Disaggregation of Support
After a substantial discussion of the current process used for
redefinition and disaggregation of areas for support, the Joint Board
continued its endorsement of the current process and standards. These are
the procedures, presumptions, and efforts to avoid creamskimming used by
the FCC in Virginia Cellular and Highland Cellular.213
VIII. SCOPE OF SUPPORT
In its recommendation, the Joint Board dealt with two main missions..
The first issue concerned the process of ETC designation. The second issue
was to examine the scope of service. Of the Joint Board's
recommendations in its report, the one with the broadest potential impact
was its recommendation on scope of support. The issue facing the Joint
Board was, effectively, how to balance universal service goals with funding
realities in ETC designation and support.
A. Primary Connection Provision
The Joint Board recommended that "the Commission limit the scope
of high-cost support to a single connection that provides access to the
public telephone network." 214 Currently, all lines in high-cost areas are
eligible for support.2 15 If adopted, this limitation would end support for
second lines used in homes for Internet access, children's calls, fax
machines, or other uses. It would also end support for multiple lines used
by businesses in rural areas. Perhaps most importantly for the cost of
universal support, this limitation would end universal service support for
both a landline and a cellular phone subscribed to by an individual or
business. It would force consumers to choose to designate a single
connection as their primary connection. Any secondary connections would
be unsubsidized.
Several arguments were presented by the Joint Board in support of its
recommendation. First, it argued that a single connection is consistent with
the 1996 Telecommunications Act as a primary connection "provides
access to all of the services included in the definition of universal service
under section 254(c)."' 2 16 A single connection also provides "access to all
213. Virginia Cellular Order, supra note 18, paras. 40-45; Highland Cellular Order,
supra note 28, paras. 37-42.
214. Joint Board Decision, supra note 22, para. 56.
215. Id. para. 58.
216. Id. para. 62.
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of the additional telecommunications and information services, including
advanced services, available to consumers through the public telephone
network." 21 7 In arguing that support of a primary connection would be
consistent with the Act, the Joint Board expressed its belief that
"supporting a single connection would fulfill the statutory principles of
sufficiency and predictability. ' '2 18 Rural telephone companies contended
that primary connection support would jeopardize these principles. 219
The second argument favoring only primary connection support is
that continued subsidy of multiple connections threatens the Universal
Service Fund's sustainability. 22 The growth of high-cost Universal Service
Fund's support used to sponsor competitive ETCs has increased
dramatically. 221 The Joint Board stated that "[m]uch of this growth
represents supported wireless connections that supplement, rather than
replace, wireline service. ' 222 It reasoned that with limiting support to a
primary connection, "[h]igh-cost support would increase with primary
connection growth, rather than with growth in the total number of
connections provided by both incumbent and competitive ETCs."
223
Therefore, single connection support would reduce growth in demand on
high-cost universal service funding and would make the fund more
sustainable.
The Joint Board's final argument in support of a single connection
was that supporting a single connection would send more appropriate entry
signals and would be competitively neutral.224 It argued that under the
proposed model, companies would not be artificially encouraged to seek
ETC status where a rational business case cannot be made. "Competitive
ETCs instead would have incentives to enter rural and high-cost areas only
where doing so makes rational business sense under a model assuming
incremental support only for subscribers captured from, or unserved by, the
,,225incumbent LEC. Under the proposed model, support would be available
to all ETCs based upon the number of primary connections, regardless of
the type of technology. This single connection proposal's impact upon rural
businesses, schools, hospitals, local governments, and other organization's
with multiple land lines would likely be politically untenable.
217. Id.
218. Id. para. 64.
219. Id. para. 65 (citation omitted).




224. Id. para. 69.
225. Id.
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B. Maintaining Sufficient Support for Rural Areas
The potential negative impact that limiting universal support to a
primary connection might have on rural incumbent telephone companies
was recognized by the Joint Board. In its response, it offered the FCC four
alternatives for future funding which provide ILECs some protection from
revenue loss. It suggested that the FCC seek comment on these options. In
all four proposals, the current ability of a competitive ETC to receive
greater per-line support as it captures incumbent LEC lines would be
ended-thus preventing upward spirals in per-line support, which are
possible under the status quo. In two of the proposals, if a competitor
captures a primary connection, the incumbent would lose a proportionate
amount of funding. In the third option, the incumbent would be held
harmless. The options are further described below.
1. Restatement Proposal
The first option presented by the Joint Board is the restatement
proposal. Under this option, rural carriers would be "eligible for high-cost
support based on total embedded costs averaged on a study-area level."
226
As part of this proposal, "[tihe total amount of high-cost support flowing to
an area served by a rural carrier could be restated in terms of support per
first line, rather than support per line, without any effect on the amount of
support received by the rural carrier at the time support is restated.
227
2. Lump Sum Payment Proposal
The Joint Board's second alternative was to provide rural carriers the
same amount of high-cost support on a per-line basis as it received
previously, but only for primary lines. In addition, the carriers would also
receive a lump sum payment compensating for the loss of support for
nonprimary lines. Loss of primary lines to competitors would only result in
the high-cost support reductions based upon support for those lines. This
structure would prevent competitors from seeking ETC status for arbitrage228
purposes. The Joint Board acknowledged that the flaw in this proposal is
that "making lump-sum payments available to incumbents, but not to
competitive ETCs, could be inconsistent with the principle of competitive
neutrality."
' 2 29
226. Id. para. 73.
227. Id.
228. Id. para. 74.
229. Id.
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3. Hold Harmless Proposal
The third alternative offered by the Joint Board was the hold harmless
proposal. This proposal would freeze the per-line support available to
competitive ETCs upon competitive entry. Like the other two proposals, a
competitive ETC would be compensated based upon primary lines
captured. The amount of support flowing to the incumbent LEC would not
diminish when losing lines. The hold harmless proposal recognizes that
incumbent LECs have made substantial investments in infrastructure in
reliance upon the existing universal support formula and have substantial
stranded investments. This proposal, like the lump sum proposal, is
designed to prevent "competitive carriers [from seeking] ETC status merely
for arbitrage purposes." The difference between the hold harmless
proposal and the status quo is that under the hold harmless proposal, the
competitive ETC would not benefit from the incumbent LEC's increase in
per-line cost as the competitor captures a portion of the incumbent's lines.
4. Cap on Per-Line Support upon Competitive Entry
In its fourth recommendation on scope of funding, the Joint Board
suggested capping support on a per primary connection basis upon the
entry of a competitor, which would affect both incumbent LECs and
competitive ETCs. The Joint Board suggested that "[t]hereafter, per-
primary line support would be adjusted annually based on an index factor,
rather than changes in the rural carrier's embedded costs."'232 The Joint
Board justified this cap as "necessary to implement primary-line limitation
and to prevent an upward spiral in support due to capture of primary
connections by competitive ETCs."2 33 Without the change, the Joint Board
pointed out that "the high-cost universal service mechanisms calculate
support for rural carrier[s'] ... per-primary line[, which] automatically
increases as its total embedded costs are spread over fewer lines." 234 Thus,
the absence of a per-line cap would, in the Joint Board's words, "obviate
the effect of a single-connection limitation.' '235 It stated that without the
cap
fund size could grow significantly if rural carriers lose primary
connections to competitive ETCs, because rural carriers would
continue to receive the same total support, but the per-line support
230. Id. para. 75.
231. Id.
232. Id. para. 77.
233. Id. para. 78.
234. Id.
235. Id.
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amounts available to both the incumbent LEC and competitive ETCs
would increasY39s rural carriers' per-line costs were spread over fewer
primary lines.
The Joint Board went on to recommend that the FCC develop a record on
what index factor should be used to adjust support each year.
C. Other Issues
The Joint Board, under the title of "Other Issues," discussed the
problem of rural small businesses needing multiple lines and suggested that
the FCC seek additional comment on the need for universal support of
more than a primary connection. 237 It conceded that an option for
addressing this concern was to potentially allow high-cost support for a
designated number of connections per business, rather than limiting support
to a single connection.2 38 The Joint Board suggested that the FCC develop
a record on "the treatment of lines provided by unbundled network element
(UNE)-based competitive ETCs under [the] recommended approach."
239
The Joint Board encouraged the FCC to seek comment on the impact of the
primary, connection proposal on telecommunications investment in rural
areas. Finally, it encouraged -the FCC to consider whether it should
provide transitional measures for support of existing ETCs in moving to a
single connection support system.
2 4 1
IX. BASIS OF SUPPORT
The final major issue that the Joint Board tangled with in this report
was the issue of the basis of support for ETCs. It discussed the mechanism
of determining the base amount of support provided ETCs. The base for
nonrural carriers is a forward-looking model, while the base for rural
carriers is founded upon the carrier's own costs. Support for competitive
ETCs is determined based upon the costs of the incumbent in the area.242
The Joint Board recognized the arguments of parties suggesting change to
this basis of support and of those supporting it. Arguments for change rest
upon the concept that "basing a competitive ETC's support on the
incumbent LEC's embedded costs provides a windfall and creates an unfair
advantage for competitive ETCs with lower costs."'243 Arguments for
236. Id.
237. Id. para. 84.
238. Id.
239. Id. para. 85.
240. Id. para. 86.
241. Id.
242. Id. para. 93.
243. Id.
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support of the status quo are that "the current rules are necessary for
competitive neutrality and are the least administratively burdensome way to
administer support.
While the Joint Board expressed its concern "that funding a
competitive ETC based upon the incumbent LEC's embedded costs may
not be the most economically rational method for calculating support," 24 5 it
did not recommend a change in the basis in this report. It recommended
that the FCC ask it to conduct a comprehensive review of both rural and
nonrural mechanisms. 246 The Joint Board made this request as it did "not
yet have an adequate record to analyze and understand the consequences of
recommending a change in the basis of support for areas served by rural
carriers that face competition."
247
X. SUMMARY OF JOINT BOARD REPORT
The Joint Board Report was developed concurrently with the
proceedings in Virginia Cellular and Highland Cellular, and it endorses the
path the FCC blazed in those decisions. The Joint Board and the FCC
appear to be in agreement that states have authority to establish eligibility
requirements above those in section 213(e)(1) of the federal Act. Many of
the recommended permissive guidelines have been established by FCC
precedent in making ETC designations. For example, the FCC imposed
consumer protection standards, weighed local usage offerings, and
stiffened the public interest test with a substantial emphasis on avoiding
creamskimming. The Joint Board endorsed the current process used for
redefinition and disaggregating areas of- support which was applied in
Virginia Cellular and Highland Cellular.
Some of the suggested permissive guidelines would differ from the
guidelines used by the FCC. These include: determining that ETCs have
the financial resources and ability to provide quality services, determining
the ability of the CETC to operate in emergencies, and requiring ETCs to
be prepared to provide equal access in the case that other ETCs in that
service area relinquish their rights as ETCs. The Joint Board rejected
suggestions to use a specific cost-benefit analysis, but it did reason that per-
line support provides a marker that can be used in determining whether
allowing an additional ETC in an area is in the public interest. The Joint
Board recommended that the FCC solicit comments on whether such
national benchmarks justify additional consideration.
244. Id.
245. Id. para. 96.
246. Id. para. 88.
247. Id. para. 96.
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Some of the Joint Board's recommendations addressed the larger
universal service issues beyond the standards for designating an ETC. The
Joint Board recommended that ETC status become an annual status
requiring compliance with newly adopted standards, instead of a permanent
designation. The Joint Board's recommendation limiting scope of support
to a single connection is the recommendation with the greatest potential
fiscal savings for the USF and greatest opposition. This proposal and the
Joint Board's first three proposed alternatives for implementation are likely
to draw substantial comment and controversy. Likewise, the fourth
proposal capping per-line support upon entry of a CETC is a significant
change designed to slow the growth of the USF, but is also a highly
controversial recommendation due to its financial impact upon both ILECs
and CETCs. The Joint Board identified other issues for the FCC to seek
additional comment upon in developing potential rulemaking.
XI. CONCLUSION
In passing the 1996 Telecommunications Act, Congress anticipated
competition would reduce future demand upon the newly devised system of
explicit funding of universal service. Instead, demands upon the USF have
skyrocketed as wireless technologies have allowed carriers to provide cost
effective wireless voice services which meet the ETC service requirements
established in the Act. These standards are less stringent than the ILEC
standards mandated by other federal and state requirements. The general
authority to designate ETCs is delegated to the states; however, in the case
of Indian reservations and states which have disavowed jurisdiction over
CMRS providers, the FCC determines ETC eligibility. In Virginia Cellular
and Highland Cellular, the FCC has substantially advanced a framework
for decision making that is much more extensive than the FCC used in its
early decisions. The FCC's weighing of the public interest in these cases is
far-reaching, especially when considering applications for rural service
areas. This framework should benefit consumers due to its focus on
services. The reporting requirements modeled by the FCC should assist in
assuring that Universal Service funding is used as intended in supporting
infrastructure and services and is not simply a subsidy distorting markets in
which CMRS providers would naturally participate without incentives due
to the relatively low cost structure of wireless technologies.
The Joint Board's 2004 Recommended Decision on eligible
telecommunications carrier status and high-cost universal service support
embraces the same general framework and recommends additional factors.
The Joint Board recommends that the FCC adopt permissive federal
guidelines to guide the state utility commissions in their ETC deliberations.
[Vol. 57
Number 3] VIRGINIA AND HIGHLAND CELLULAR FRAMEWORK 553
The Joint Board recommended substantial changes to the scope of
support-limiting universal service support to a single connection per
subscriber and altering the method of determining support for providers.
The impact of this recommendation would restrict draws on the USF. The
Joint Board argued the single line proposal will satisfy the statutory
principles of sufficiency and predictability. Second lines used for fax
machines, Internet access, children, and other purposes would lose subsidy.
Users with both landline and cellular phones would be required to
designate a primary line. The Joint Board recommends the FCC gather
comments on this and several other issues. Overall, the imperatives to
restrict draws upon the USF, to encourage competition, to assure
sufficiency and predictability have demanded change. The FCC has taken
clear first steps in tightening the ETC designation process and has good
reason to adopt some of the permissive standards as recommended by the
Joint Board. However, even with Joint Board recommendations, the next
decisions on the scope of support will be much more formidable as these
decisions will impact the annual flow of hundreds of millions of dollars of
universal service support.
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